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Abstract—The federation of information technology (IT) systems 
is a common approach to bundle capabilities and get the best 
results for all participants. Cloud computing and electronic 
identity (eID) are only two out of many domains, for which 
federated solutions have been a topic of scientific and corporate 
interest during the past years. Recently, the H2020 project 
SUNFISH has introduced a new cloud-federation approach 
called ‘Federation as a Service’ (FaaS). FaaS enables secure 
cloud federations, where data owners remain in full control of 
their data and workflows. In this paper, we identify shortcomings 
of the FaaS approach in terms of secure and reliable user 
authentication. In this sense, data security and protection 
mechanisms are only as good as the applied authentication 
measures. We solve this issue by proposing the integration of an 
existing pan-European federation of national eID systems into 
FaaS. This increases security guarantees of FaaS by using a 
trustworthy and liable eID solution that has a strong legal basis 
in the form of the EU eIDAS Regulation. A first successful 
implementation and deployment of the proposed solution 
demonstrates its feasibility and shows the great potential of 
combining federation solutions from the cloud domain and the 
eID domain. 
Keywords-cloud computing, electronic identity, federation, 
security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The federation of IT systems has become an important 
topic in both research and industry. In general, a federation 
consists of different entities agreeing on a certain standard of 
operation and thus achieving interoperability. The advantages 
are apparent: by joining a federation, each federation member 
can benefit from functionality of all other members of the 
federation. 
One area with a high potential to benefit from federation 
concepts is cloud computing. If multiple clouds are 
interconnected, i.e. federated, users from one cloud can benefit 
from the combined functionality of the entire federation. For 
instance, two cooperating companies could agree to federate 
their private clouds in order to benefit from each other’s 
infrastructure and data-processing capabilities. Despite its high 
potentials, the federation of clouds is a complex proposition, 
whose implementation raises several challenges, many of them 
related to data security. In the example given above, the two 
companies might certainly agree to exchange certain data with 
the other party, as part of using its infrastructure, but will 
naturally refrain from granting universal access to all data 
processed in their own private clouds. Maintaining control of 
own data is hence the key challenge in federated cloud 
environments. 
Overcoming this challenge has been the goal of the 
European Union (EU) funded research project SUNFISH 1 . 
SUNFSIH has introduced the concept of Federation as a 
Service (FaaS). Its goal is to enable secure cloud federations 
that provide a higher degree of functionality by allowing the 
cross-cloud exchange of data, but are still able to meet security 
requirements of these data. The proposed FaaS concept and its 
implementation developed by SUNFISH achieve this. 
The FaaS solution developed by SUNFISH bases on 
reliable policy-definition and policy-enforcement methods. 
These methods restrict data access to authorized users with the 
necessary assigned privileges. This approach requires users to 
be reliably identified and authenticated beforehand. Only if the 
identity of users is reliably verified by means of secure 
authentication schemes, policy-enforcement methods can work 
effectively. The FaaS solution developed by SUNFISH relies 
on the implicit assumption that end users are reliably 
authenticated within their home cloud-environment. 
Accordingly, all federation members build an implicit circle of 
trust and assume that all members act responsibly when 
authenticating its users. However, in certain scenarios, this 
assumption might be unrealistic. If a member cloud of the 
federation fails to authenticate reliably its users, restricting data 
access to users with certain roles or privileges is actually 
pointless.  
In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem. 
Concretely, we propose to combine SUNFISH’s FaaS solution 
with the federation of European national eID solutions defined 
by the European Union's eIDAS Regulation [11]. The eIDAS 
Regulation defines an interoperability solution to federate 
existing national eID solutions such as the Austrian Citizen 
Card [5], the Belgian eID card [2], or the Swedish eID [12]. 
This solution can be used to reliably identify and authenticate 
users across Europe. Backed by the EU eIDAS Regulation, this 
eID solution has a strong legal foundation. In addition, well-
defined requirements and established governance processes 
guarantee an adequate level of security. The eIDAS-based 
federated eID solution can hence be regarded as ready-to-use 
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building block that provides secure and reliable user 
identification and authentication. We propose to integrate this 
building block into SUNFISH’s FaaS concept and 
implementation. We show how to combine the federation 
concepts behind FaaS and the eIDAS-based eID solution on 
conceptual and architectural level and demonstrate a working 
proof of concept.  
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. Section II provides relevant background information 
on SUNFISH’s FaaS concept and the eIDAS-based eID 
federation. Section III then introduces in detail our proposal to 
combine eIDAS-based user authentication with SUNFISH’s 
FaaS concept. Findings obtained during evaluation of the 
proposed solution are discussed in Section IV. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This section elaborates on the two baseline technologies 
combined in this work. While Section II.A focuses on the 
research project SUNFISH and its FaaS concept, Section II.B 
introduces the EU eIDAS Regulation and its definition of a 
secure eID federation across Europe. 
A. SUNFISH: Secure Cloud Federations 
SUNFISH is a H2020 project funded by the European 
Union with the goal to enable secure data sharing and 
federation of clouds [10]. SUNFISH ensures that data owners 
maintain control of their data and can define flexibly who is 
allowed to access data for which purposes and to which extent. 
For this purpose, SUNFISH has developed FaaS, an extended 
and flexible data-security governance model, which supports a 
variety of scenarios. FaaS relies on classical eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) [7] based approaches, 
which are already widely used today to enforce data-access 
control [1] [4].  
The core of the XACML enforcement model comprises 
several well-defined entities including the Policy Enforcement 
Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the Policy 
Administration Point (PAP) and the Policy Information Point 
(PIP). This separation of components yields a clear assignment 
of responsibilities with regard to policy enforcement. The PEP 
is the contact point for applications and issues access-decision 
requests to the PDP. The responses respectively the decisions 
are then enforced by the PEP. The policy store itself is 
logically separated into the Policy Retrieval Point (PRP) and 
the Policy Administration Point (PAP). The flow for a usual 
policy-decision request starts at the PEP, where the request is 
generated, and is passed on to the PDP. The PDP gathers 
potentially missing attributes from connected Policy 
Information Points (PIPs) and retrieves a list of matching 
policies from the PRP. The evaluation result is returned to the 
PEP where the decision is finally enforced. 
FaaS, as introduced by SUNFISH and described in detail 
by Suzic and Reiter [9], extends this generic XACML approach 
with additional components. Furthermore, it provides a 
concrete implementation of the XACML approach for 
federated cloud environments and closes identified gaps of the 
XACML specification. Figure 1 illustrates the FaaS concept 
developed by SUNFISH. Different cloud environments (each a 
member of the cloud federation) are modeled as so-called 
tenants. A special infrastructure tenant operates common 
services like the policy-decision service and the policy store. 
The Blockchain technology [13] [14] is used by the federation 
to guarantee integrity of stored policies. 
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Figure 1.  Basic building blocks of the FaaS concept. 
All tenants dedicate computational resources to the 
federation, which are used to deploy and operate services and 
applications. The classical XACML model is extended by 
introducing the Policy Enforcement Gateways (PEG) entity. 
The PEG extends the responsibilities of the PEP by means of 
gateway functionality. PEGs are deployed at the edge of each 
tenant. Acting as a gateway, they protect the entire 
communication entering or leaving this tenant. The PEG 
analyzes the traffic and issues policy-decision requests to the 
PDP. Based on the policies defined by the data owner, a 
decision is derived, e.g., if an application from a certain tenant 
is allowed to access a service deployed in another tenant or if a 
user may access a particular service.  
Summarizing, the FaaS concept developed by SUNFISH 
enables the federation of clouds while still leaving control of 
the data in the hands of the respective data owners. Apparently, 
the FaaS concept does not focus explicitly on the 
authentication of users. Instead, FaaS implicitly assumes that 
users are authenticated reliably in their respective home tenants 
and that user-specific policies can therefore be enforced 
reliably. 
B. eIDAS: Secure Identity Federations 
The Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in 
the internal market (eIDAS Regulation) [11] is the legal basis 
for the provision of cross-border eID and trust services in the 
European Union. Although covering different kinds of trust 
services, the regulation has a strong focus on eID and on 
achieving interoperability between existing national eID 
solutions of EU Member States (MS). Essentially, the eIDAS 
Regulation defines an interoperability framework that enables 
European citizens to use an eID issued by MS X for 
identification and authentication at a service provided by MS 
Y. Technical foundations of the eIDAS Regulation have been 
developed in several European large-scale pilots (LSPs) such 
as STORK2 and STORK 2.03 [6].  
Member State X Member State Y
IDP-Y
(eIDAS Node)
IDP-X
(eIDAS Node)
eIDAS Identity Federation
SP-Y
(Service Provider)
Identity Assertion
Member State Z
IDP-Z
(eIDAS Node)
eIDAS Identity Federation eIDAS Identity Federation
SP-Z2
(Service Provider)
SP-Z1
(Service Provider)
Identity 
Assertion
Identity
Assertion
Citizen-X
Service Access
User Identification and Authentication
Service AccessService Access
 
Figure 2.  eIDAS-based eID federation. 
The general architecture of the eIDAS interoperability 
framework is shown in Figure 2 by means of three exemplary 
EU MS. Each MS operates an own identity provider (IDP) 
denoted as eIDAS Node. Each national eIDAS Node is able to 
identify and authenticate citizens from the Node's own MS and 
accepts authentication requests from Service Providers located 
in the same MS. In order to allow citizens access to services in 
other MS as well, all eIDAS Nodes are federated, i.e. build a 
cross-border circle of trust. 
The functionality provided by this eID federation is 
explained best by means of a concrete example. Assume that 
(according to Figure 2) a citizen from MS X accesses a service 
provided by MS Y, i.e. SP-Y. To identify and authenticate the 
citizen, SP-Y sends an authentication request to the eIDAS 
Node of MS Y, i.e. IDP-Y. As the citizen is from MS X, IDP-Y 
is unable to authenticate the citizen itself. Therefore, it sends an 
authentication request to the eIDAS Node of MS X, i.e. IDP-X. 
IDP-X identifies and authenticates the citizen, issues an 
identity assertion, and returns this assertion to IDP-Y. Due to 
the established eID federation, IDP-X and IDP-Y mutually 
accept issued identity assertions. This way, IDP-Y supplies SP-
Y with a valid identity assertion, which is finally used by SP-Y 
to identify and authenticate the citizen from MS X. 
In summary, the eIDAS interoperability framework assures 
that all European citizens can continue to use their existing 
national eIDs. At the same time, national IDPs only need to 
support their own national eID solution. Support for foreign 
eIDs is achieved by federating IDPs (eIDAS Nodes) of other 
MS. The technical interoperability framework defined by the 
eIDAS Regulation is currently being set up in EU MS. 
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The main problem tackled in this paper is the potentially 
weak realization of user authentication in FaaS-based cloud 
federations. This section introduces a solution to this problem 
by extending the concept of FaaS with secure user 
authentication provided by the existing eIDAS-based eID 
federation. 
A. Relevant Use Cases and Requirements 
Requirements to be met by the proposed solution have been 
derived beforehand from relevant use cases. Use cases and 
derived requirements are detailed in this section.  
Identification of relevant use cases has been based on three 
general assumptions. First, we have assumed that each FaaS 
tenant features an IDP. Second, we have relied on the 
assumption that the IDP of a FaaS tenant is able to identify and 
authenticate users originating from this tenant. Third, we have 
assumed that applications deployed in a FaaS tenant can 
request the IDP of the same tenant to identify and authenticate 
users. All three assumptions can be regarded as realistic and 
comply with usual cloud deployments. 
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Figure 3.  Relevant use cases 
Considering the three assumptions made, yields the more 
detailed model of SUNFISH’s FaaS concept shown in Figure 
3. Note that Figure 3 still resembles Figure 1, i.e. shows the 
original FaaS concept. In addition, Figure 3 puts an additional 
focus on user authentication via IDPs. Figure 3 shows that two 
basic authentication scenarios can be distinguished, yielding 
the following two general use cases: 
 Use Case 1: A user originating from Tenant A 
authenticates at a cloud application deployed in 
Tenant A. This means that user and application 
originate from the same FaaS tenant. 
 Use Case 2: A user originating from Tenant A 
authenticates at a cloud application deployed in 
Tenant B. In contrast to Use Case 1, user and 
application originate from different tenants in this 
use case. 
The first use case resembles a classical setup of an identity 
management system consisting of a user, a service provider 
(application), and an IDP. The IDP authenticates the user on 
behalf of the service provider. In the context of SUNFISH’s 
FaaS concept, the main challenge in this scenario is the FaaS-
specific PEG component acting as gateway between the user 
and the application to be accessed. This component must be 
appropriately integrated into the authentication process. 
The second use case is even more complex. In this use case, 
user and application originate from different tenants. Hence, 
there does not exist any IDP that is able to do both, receive 
authentication requests from the application and authenticate 
the user. Instead, two different IDPs are involved and need to 
interact in order to complete a successful user-authentication 
process. In addition, the same challenge as in Use Case 1 
applies, i.e. the FaaS-specific PEG component needs to be 
integrated appropriately into the authentication process. 
From the two sketched use cases, two general requirements 
can be derived for the proposed solution:  
 Requirement 1: User identification and 
authentication functionality must be integrated 
into FaaS-based cloud federations such that FaaS-
specific architecture components like the PEG are 
adequately addressed. 
 Requirement 2: IDPs deployed in different 
tenants must be federated, in order to assure that 
users can identify and authenticate at applications 
deployed in other tenants. 
Obviously, Requirement 2 suggests reliance on an 
established eID-federation solution. In Europe, such a solution 
is defined by the eIDAS Regulation and currently set up in EU 
MS. It is hence reasonable to employ the full potential of this 
approved solution and integrate it into the FaaS cloud 
federation model. The architecture that results from combining 
SUNFISH’s FaaS concept with the eIDAS-based eID 
federation is introduced in the following section. 
B. Architecture 
We have combined SUNFISH’s FaaS concept with the 
eIDAS-based eID federation according to the architecture 
shown in Figure 4. Note that in addition to architectural 
components, Figure 4 also shows implementation-related 
entities to support a better understanding. These entities are 
elaborated in more detail in Section C. For the sake of 
simplicity, the architecture shown in Figure 4 sketches only 
two MS participating in the eID federation. In reality, the 
federation spans all EU MS that have successfully set up the 
eIDAS-based interoperability framework.  
Figure 4 illustrates how the proposed solution meets 
Requirement 1 defined in Section A. In order to combine the 
two federation approaches, the solution transfers the conceptual 
role of the service provider from the cloud application to the 
PEG. Accordingly, the PEG interacts with the corresponding 
IDP and receives identity assertions issued by this IDP. This 
implies that the user authenticates at the PEG instead of the 
cloud application itself. Accordingly, the PEG can implement 
access-control mechanisms based on the user's confirmed 
identity. As a downside of this approach, the cloud application 
no longer receives identity assertions from the IDP. 
Consequently, the cloud application cannot use identity 
information contained in the assertion to provide identity-based 
features or to apply identity-based access-control schemes 
itself. To remove this drawback, the proposed solution foresees 
that the PEG supplies the cloud application with required 
identity and role attributes. This way, the cloud application 
benefits from the user's identity information without assuming 
the role of a service provider. 
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Figure 4.  Architecture of the proposed solution 
Requirement 2 defined in Section A is implicitly met by 
integrating the eIDAS-based eID-federation framework. 
Reliance on this framework and on eIDAS-compliant IDPs 
guarantees that users can authenticate at arbitrary cloud 
applications, independent from the tenant, in which the 
respective application is deployed. In theory, each PEG can 
access and use each IDP. However, in practice each PEG will 
most likely be able to communicate with one IDP only, i.e. 
with the eIDAS Node of the MS, in which the PEG itself is 
deployed. Note that this does not limit functionality, as all 
eIDAS-compliant IDPs are federated. Benefits of this 
federation also become apparent from the process-flow 
description provided in Section D. 
C. Implementation 
Before elaborating on the proposed solution's basic process 
flow, we introduce a few implementation details to support a 
deeper understanding of the proposed solution. To evaluate its 
feasibility, we have implemented all relevant building blocks 
of the proposed solution and deployed them in an evaluation 
environment. Details on evaluation results are provided in 
Section IV. Our implementation has been based on components 
developed by SUNFISH. The deployment spans across Europe 
by integrating the Austrian and Swedish eIDAS infrastructures 
with their already available eIDAS Nodes into the SUNFISH 
infrastructure. These countries have been chosen as their 
national eIDAS infrastructures are sufficiently set up. In 
addition to the eIDAS Nodes, each MS is assumed to host a 
computational FaaS tenant in this evaluation setup. An integral 
part of the FaaS model is the Infrastructure Tenant, thus also 
part of the evaluation setup. The Infrastructure Tenant hosts 
components related to policy evaluation and supports the PEGs 
of other tenants in enforcing defined policies. 
In addition to the architecture, Figure 4 also shows some 
implementation-related components. When digging more into 
technical details, it becomes apparent that the PEG actually 
comprises the gateway components itself as well as two proxy 
components. First, the Reverse Proxy serves as a basic router to 
handle incoming HTTP(S) requests. This approach allows 
mapping multiple services to the same instance of the 
Transparent FaaS Proxy. Consequently, the Reverse Proxy can 
provide transport-layer security on a domain basis or load 
balancing for increased scalability and flexibility. Additionally, 
this entails that services can be migrated transparently to the 
FaaS model, without the need to change existing application 
configurations. Second, the Transparent FaaS Proxy serves as 
intermediate layer between legacy applications and the FaaS 
cloud-federation infrastructure. This enables an efficient 
integration of legacy applications into the FaaS infrastructure, 
without interfering with existing workflows. By aiming at a 
transparent deployment of services and by bridging the gap 
between legacy applications and managed cloud federations, a 
better acceptance of the overall system can be achieved. 
D. Process Flow 
To bring the introduction of the proposed solution down to 
a round figure, a typical user-authentication process is sketched 
in this section. Focus is put on Use Case 2 as defined in Section 
A, since this use case is regarded more complex and thus more 
challenging. 
Use Case 2 assumes that a user (User Y) from MS Y wants 
to access a cloud application located in FaaS Demo Tenant A. 
It is further assumed that the user can only be authenticated by 
eIDAS Node Y, while the accessed cloud application can 
communicate with eIDAS Node X only. This setup requires 
IDP X (eIDAS Node X) and IDP Y (eIDAS Node Y) to be 
federated, in order to complete a successful user-authentication 
process and to enable identity-based access-control 
mechanisms. 
The overall process flow for this scenario is illustrated in 
Figure 5. In the beginning, the user triggers the process by 
requesting access to a Demo Application. User Y uses a client 
that is unaware of the underlying FaaS infrastructure. Hence, 
the user enters the public URL of the Demo Application. The 
FaaS infrastructure intercepts the user’s request using the 
Reverse Proxy in FaaS Demo Tenant A (1). 
The Reverse Proxy forwards the intercepted request to the 
Transparent FaaS Proxy located in the same tenant. The 
Transparent FaaS Proxy acts as adapter for legacy (FaaS-
unaware) applications and integrates them with the FaaS 
policy-enforcement infrastructure (2). The Transparent FaaS 
Proxy transforms the original request into a format suitable for 
the FaaS infrastructure (3). This request is then forwarded to 
the PEG deployed in FaaS Demo Tenant A (4). The PEG 
issues an authorization request to the PDP (5). As User Y is not 
authenticated at that time, the PDP denies access to the 
requested Demo Application (6). Consequently, the PEG 
requests an identity assertion from eIDAS Node X (7). The 
eIDAS Node X initiates the user-authentication process by 
displaying a selection screen of all available and supported 
eIDAS-compliant IDPs (8). User Y selects the preferred eIDAS 
node (i.e. eIDAS Node Y) (9). Based on this selection, eIDAS 
Node X requests an identity assertion from eIDAS Node Y 
using the eIDAS-based interoperability protocol (10). 
The eIDAS Node Y authenticates User Y by means of the 
user's national eID (11) (12). After successful verification of 
User Y's identity, eIDAS Node Y issues an eIDAS-compliant 
identity assertion (13) and forwards it to eIDAS Node X (14). 
The eIDAS Node X transforms the received assertion into its 
national format (15) and returns the transformed identity 
assertion to the PEG (16). The PEG extracts required identity 
attributes from the assertion (17), but still needs to verify 
whether the provided attributes are sufficient to grant access to 
the Demo Application. Thus, the PEG again issues an 
authorization request to the PDP, this time including available 
user information (18). If the data provided meets all defined 
access policies, the PDP grants access to the requested Demo 
Application (19). In the last step, the PEG forwards the initial 
user request to the Demo Application located in FaaS Demo 
Tenant A and includes available user information (20). This 
completes the user-authentication process. 
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Figure 5.  Process flow of Use Case 2 
Note that the process flow for Use Case 1 is merely a subset 
of Use Case 2’s process flow sketched above. The main 
difference is the lack of communication between IDPs, as in 
Use Case 1 the initially requested IDP is already able to 
authenticate the user. Thus, we do not elaborate on Use Case 1 
in more detail at this point. 
IV. EVALUATION 
We have conducted a first evaluation of the proposed 
solution to verify its feasibility and to learn its benefits and 
drawbacks. Therefore, we have created a working prototype 
implementation. The prototype has been deployed and operated 
in an evaluation environment during an evaluation period. As 
expected, several lessons have been learned during this 
evaluation period. From these lessons learned, we were able to 
derive benefits and open issues of the proposed solution. 
The conducted evaluation has shown that the proposed 
solution has indeed several advantages over SUNFISH’s initial 
FaaS concept. Overall, the proposed solution provides a higher 
level of security, as it takes away the responsibility of user 
authentication from members of cloud federations and assigns 
this task to a highly specialized and approved solution, i.e. the 
eIDAS-based eID federation. Since the eIDAS Regulation 
defines strict security requirements for eID solutions being part 
of this federation, the overall security of FaaS solutions is 
raised. Another advantage of the proposed solution is its strong 
legal foundation in the form of the eIDAS Regulation. This 
implies that responsibilities and liabilities are clearly defined 
on legal level, again leveraging the quality and reliability of the 
used eID federation. Its implementation and operation have 
shown that the proposed solution also provides the advantage 
of easy integration. Due to its generic architecture, the eIDAS-
based eID solution integrates smoothly into the FaaS concept. 
Information exchange between these two worlds, i.e. cloud 
federation and eID federation, take place via well-defined 
interfaces only, yielding a neat integrated solution. Finally, 
evaluation has shown that the proposed solution is in full 
conformance with SUNFISH’s FaaS approach. All concepts 
of FaaS and its underlying processing model can be left 
unmodified when integrating eIDAS-based user authentication. 
The eIDAS-based eID federation does not affect negatively 
functionality of FaaS-based cloud federations by any means. 
In addition to these benefits, lessons learned during 
evaluation have also yielded some open issues. One challenge 
the proposed solution needs to face is the rather slow take-up 
of the eIDAS Regulation. Although the regulation is already in 
effect, its implementation in the EU MS is still an ongoing 
process. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that all EU citizens 
already have assigned a compliant eID issued by their MS. 
However, it can be expected that the situation will improve in 
future, as MS continue to implement the eIDAS Regulation. 
Another issue to be considered is the existence of decoupled 
eID systems. In most corporate enterprises, proprietary eID 
systems are established and used. Users are not identified by 
means of their eIDAS-based eIDs (even if they have one), but 
by means of internal eIDs issued by the respective enterprise or 
institution. Integrating our proposed solution to such a scenario 
leads to two decoupled eID systems in place. In this case, 
means must be applied to map eIDAS-based eIDs to legacy 
eIDs used internally. Although such a mapping is expected to 
be technically feasible in most cases, it introduces additional 
effort. 
Overall, the conducted evaluation has shown that the 
proposed solution is feasible and significantly improves the 
SUNFISH’s original FaaS concept in several aspects.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed a solution that enhances 
SUNFISH’s FaaS concept by integrating a highly secure and 
reliable pan-European federated eID solution, i.e. the eIDAS-
based eID federation. We achieved an integration of eIDAS-
based user authentication in full conformance with the original 
FaaS processing model. Our solution outsources the security-
critical task of user identification and authentication to an 
approved solution that is backed by European law and 
applicable throughout Europe. This way, our solution 
eliminates a potential weakness of FaaS solutions, i.e. the weak 
implementation of user-authentication schemes, and enhances 
the security of SUNFISH’s FaaS concept. 
For future work, we plan to tackle remaining issues that we 
have derived from lessons learned during evaluation. In 
particular, we will work on solutions to problems that arise 
from the fact that the eIDAS-based eID solution might be 
decoupled from proprietary eID systems used in the respective 
members of the cloud federation. Despite these open issues to 
be addressed, we believe the proposed solution is mature 
enough to be integrated into FaaS-based cloud federations, in 
order to raise their level of security. 
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